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On Public Knowledge 
 
Joanne Lau 
Department of Philsophy 
Western Michigan University 
 
 
n “Elusive Knowledge”, Lewis begins by saying that we know a lot of trite information 
about the ordinary world1. I know what carrots are. I know how to drive a car. I know that 
when someone greets me and holds out their hand, they expect me to shake it and so on. 
However, when we talk in philosophical terms about knowledge, we have no reason to say that 
we really know anything. There seem to be two contexts of knowing something. Regarding the 
everyday, general type of knowledge, I know a lot. But when I put on my philosopher’s hat, it 
looks like I can’t say I really know very much at all. As a result, it is argued that either we know 
lots of things, or we must submit to skepticism2. 
Lewis does not think this is the case, and I agree. I do not think that we need to be 
skeptics; we can claim that we know a lot of things. In a further blow to skepticism, the things 
that we do know are usually not isolated. So my argument is that, unlike the skeptic, not only do 
I know a lot of things, I know a lot about things about the world that I have not checked for 
myself.  
 
The argument against Cartesian skepticism 
In the traditional skeptics’ view, Descartes begins with the individual thinker and no 
knowledge, and from that view we must first establish that I exist, and that God exists, and that 
material objects exist, etc. in order to find out about our world3. However, Coady argues that 
people do not actually operate that way. We do not begin with nothing and then establish facts 
which entail other facts to ascertain whether or not we know something4. If we accept deductive 
closure, then to know p entails knowing all of the entailments of p5. Thus, if I look at a tree, then 
it follows that I know what a tree is, that I am not hallucinating, that I am not a brain in a vat on 
Alpha Centauri, and so on. But I have not personally checked that my eyes are working properly, 
                                                 
1 Lewis, D., Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge University Press 1999. pp 418-445. 
2 This is the philosophical position where, roughly put, we cannot say we really know anything because we cannot 
attain the required level of certainty for any information we may claim to know.  
3 Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, edited by Cottingham, J., Cambridge University Press 1996. 
4 Coady, C. A. J., Testimony, Oxford University Press 1992, pp 144-147. 
5 This is a highly contentious point. Deductive closure is where knowledge of p and that p entails q. So if I know p 
and that p entails q, then q. Nozick and Dretske argued against it, but it is not a major issue here and for the purposes 
of the paper I will simply accept deductive closure: Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University 
Press 1981. 
I 
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or that I am not in a vat, or that I am not on Alpha Centauri. Further, if I had to find out all these 
peripheral things (such as proving that my eyes are working), there would be other facts 
following from the peripheral facts that I would need to also prove (such as the fact that I 
actually have eyes) and so on. But, luckily, we do not actually operate in that fashion. To know 
p, I do not have to establish the truth of other propositions q, r and s which are entailed by p6. So 
while I have not utterly defeated the Cartesian skeptic, I have at least pointed out that the 
skeptical view is neither practical nor applicable to ordinary people in ordinary situations. 
Similarly, Searle argues that we are equipped with a background which tells us, in a 
given situation, what information is superfluous, and what we should be paying attention to7. 
This background is made up of our experiences and interactions with the external world. But in 
that external world are also other people, so receiving information from people must be 
considered in the same manner as receiving information about trees. When receiving information 
from another person, the skeptic argues that you must ascertain whether or not that person is 
reliable, because you can rely only on testimony from established sources. So, according to the 
skeptic, you must figure out that there is an external world, and that certain things in the world 
are people, and that they express words, and that some are reliable. Then, based on the words 
you have heard and your past interactions with this person, you can determine whether or not to 
believe what they have said. But again, we do not actually function in this way. Instead, given 
the necessity for social interactions, we generally trust that a person is telling the truth and accept 
what he or she is saying.  
I will discuss the concept of shared knowledge later in this paper. In the meantime, I will 
examine what it is that we are sharing, before discussing how it is that the information is shared 
in a social setting.  
 
The Context and Content of Knowledge 
Lewis claims that when we say that we know something, we mean that we know it within 
a certain context8. The background lets us know what the appropriate context is for a given 
situation – so that you and I will understand each other and can exchange information9. Suppose 
I am at a bar and observe that “every glass is empty”. “Every” is a universal quantifier, but surely 
I do not mean that “every glass in the entire world is empty” at the time of my utterance; that 
would be absurd. Instead, what I mean is that I am narrowing my utterance to meaning “every 
glass within the context of this bar is empty”. In everyday language, there is an implicit 
contextual limitation in what we say. 
We must distinguish between the context of knowledge and its content. I might know that 
water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit, because this is a type of regularity that I have observed 
whilst making tea at home. My knowledge about boiling water is limited to the context of 
                                                 
6 Coady, op cit. 
7 Searle, J., The Construction of Social Reality, Free Press 1995, pp 129-132. 
8 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”, pp 425-426. 
9 Searle, op cit. 
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ordinary tea making. But were I to try and boil water on the top of Mount Everest, I might find 
out that, there, water does not boil at 212˚F. So after my expedition to Mount Everest, the 
content my knowledge about the boiling point of water has changed: in all ordinary 
circumstances, and at normal pressure, water boils at 212˚F. But I also know that there are 
exceptional circumstances at which water does not boil at 212˚F.  
When a fact’s context and the content are put together, we encounter situations where the 
content of what we assert remains the same while the context changes. I might say that I know 
the table is flat, but there is nothing that is completely flat10. So what I mean is that “relatively 
speaking, and ignoring the microscopic bumps here and there, I know that the table is flat.” 
However, flatness changes with context. A crease on a cricket pitch may be considered “flat” for 
the purposes of playing cricket, but that surface is not “flat” for someone who is an ice-skater or 
plays curling, because, for those sports, the surface of the ground requires a higher degree of 
flatness than it does for cricket. So while the content of our facts (that is, “this is/is not a flat 
surface”) remains the same, the context changes depending on other factors (such as its material, 
intended use, etc.).  
 
The context of knowledge made public 
When I say to you that “the table is flat”, I am not only expressing my belief that the table 
is flat, but I am also assuming that we share enough background knowledge so that you have 
certain basic knowledge about what a table is, and you know what flatness is, and so on. 
Similarly, you would also be assuming that when I am talking about a table being flat, what I am 
talking about conforms to what you know about tables and what you know about flatness. 
There is a lot of knowledge that is shared in the public domain, or by at least two 
individuals. Searle’s argument for collective intentionality is relevant, and I will adopt it as 
follows11. Given our social environment, there is a large set of knowledge that is shared, or at 
least tacitly assumed for us to be able to interact with each other and function socially12. We 
make these assumptions about shared knowledge regularly. The rules of multi-player games, 
road laws, etiquette, etc. all rely on the presence of a common knowledge among its participants. 
Wittgenstein’s argument for “language-games” also reflects this view in that language exists 
fundamentally for the purposes of human activity and as such language is possible only when 
people share a “form of life”, such as those discussed in this section13.  
So there is a large pool of knowledge which we assume is shared in order for everybody 
to be able to interact and work together in a society (such as everyone driving on the same side 
                                                 
10 This example is attributed to Lewis, op cit., pp 425-426. See also Unger, P., Ignorance, Claredon Press 1975, 
especially chapter II. 
11 Searle, op cit., pp 23-26. 
12 For example, we assume that two musicians playing a duet would know what each other was doing in order for 
them to play together in that they share knowledge about how to play their instruments, how to read music, etc. 
13 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, 1953, II. 
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of the street, etc.). In fact, a lot of the things we do are based on convention – that is, we roughly 
have a convention when: 
1) everyone conforms to a regularity R; 
2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since situation S is a 
coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is coordination equilibrium in S14.  
Many of our conventions are tacit – nobody has discussed the social norms of what we do 
but what we actually do is founded on a set of mutual expectations. I expect that, in a certain 
situation, you expect me to act in a certain way, and so I act in that way because that is what I 
expect you to expect from me15. In other words, in a case of independent decision between 
rational people, if I am figuring out what you will do, I am trying to replicate your practical 
reasoning. In order to do this, I need to figure out what you expect me to do, and this means that 
you would be replicating my reasoning. So, to replicate your reasoning, I need to replicate your 
attempt to replicate my reasoning. In this way, a mutual expectation arises, since we each expect 
the other to behave in a certain way16. For example, suppose you and I have arranged to meet at a 
particular time in a foreign city, but we have not specified a particular location in that city. In 
order for us to meet, I must figure out where you are expecting that I will expect to meet, and go 
there. Perhaps there is a large bridge in the middle of the city; if I think that you would think that 
I would consider a noticeable bridge to be a good place to meet, and if you also think that I think 
that you would choose such a place, then we will be able to meet at the bridge17. 
 
The causes of shared knowledge 
Further, a social environment such as ours is constantly being saturated by information. 
Labels on food, street signs, the news on television, covers of books etc. are bearers of 
information which we can obtain as knowledge. For example, as I walk up the street, there is 
information that I have come know, because I can see and read it. So I know that today, gas is at 
a certain price. I know that there is a special book offer with today’s newspaper. I know that you 
can park here only if you have a particular permit. I know that there is a crossing, and if you 
want to cross the road you push a button. And so on. Any other person who can see and read can 
also obtain this information. 
But how is this information shared? I submit that knowledge, or at least knowledge of this 
kind, is causally obtained. As I walk up the street, I am bombarded with information about gas 
prices, parking zones, book offers and so on. I am not given any justification for this information, 
                                                 
14 Lewis, D., Convention, Harvard University Press 1969, p 42. 
15 Ibid, pp 26-27. 
16 Searle would call this a collective intentionality, and I think the concepts are virtually identical for this issue at 
least. 
17 However, conventions are not always perfect, and we can become unwittingly locked into them. A bridge may not 
be the most practicable place to meet if it is raining. 
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but I assume that there is some sort of underlying cause for the information I see. If there were 
no books, then there would be no book offer. So the fact that there is a book offer is causally 
dependent on the existence of books, and the sale of the books is causally dependent on people’s 
knowledge of the book offer. But I personally have not checked if there are books or not; it is an 
assumption I make based on the common knowledge that generally, when people say that they 
are offering books, they really are offering books.  
But, regardless of whether or not I know the originating cause of a piece of information 
in the public domain, I can say that there is some sort of cause of my acquisition of that piece of 
information. Suppose that you know that ravens are black, but I have never seen a raven before. 
You tell me that ravens are black and are of a particular size. You show me lots of empirical data 
about ravens from ornithologists and photographs of black birds. On the basic requirements of 
knowledge, I now have some sort of true, justified belief about the blackness of ravens, even 
though I have never seen a raven before 18. And if I were to see a black bird of such a size and 
shape, with a particular set of behavior patterns and so on, then were I to say “That bird is a 
raven”, then I am saying that “I know the bird fits the description of a raven”, and chances are 
that I would be right. So I can say that I do know that ravens are black. But what is more is that 
my knowledge of the blackness of ravens is counterfactually dependent on your knowledge. And 
so knowledge is passed on in this fashion. 
This is true of many things. I can assert that I know that Napoleon was the emperor of 
France, although Napoleon is now dead and I have never met him, and nobody alive that I know 
has ever met him. I can also say that I know that Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the 
world, even though I have never been to Mount Everest or measured the height of any mountains 
generally. But there are people who have been to Mount Everest and other mountains, and have 
said that there is no mountain taller than Everest. If I believe their testimony, I can say that I 
know that Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the world.  
Likewise, the content of what we know depends on the causal history of that particular 
piece of information. We can have reliable knowledge even without justifications. However, in 
order for the knowledge to stay within the public sphere, it must be reaffirmed regularly. The 
vast majority of us would be inclined to say that we know the earth is round. But what is the 
justification for that claim? Perhaps I heard it from other people. Even so, if I knew who I heard 
it from, then what is their justification for the claim? Over time, as our knowledge is shared, our 
justification for that knowledge becomes weaker. So, every now and then, we have to rejustify 
and reinforce our knowledge.  
For example, I may already know that the earth is round from other people’s testimony. 
But when I am on a boat and I see the land disappear over the horizon, I might figure that the 
reason I cannot see the land anymore is due to the curvature of the earth. And eureka! I realize 
that I know the earth is round. But it is absurd to think that I did not know this before. I did know 
it, but the very fact that I have seen the effects of the earth being round for myself indicates that 
                                                 
18 I am aware that there is much debate about whether knowledge is really justified true belief but this is not the 
issue I am looking at here: Gettier, E., “Is Knowledge justified, true, belief?” Analysis 23 (1963). 
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my knowledge has been confirmed. And so my link in the causal chain of knowledge about the 
earth’s roundness is strengthened, and any of the subsequent links after mine are also stronger. 
Expert testimony: the pyramid and lattice structures 
So, sharing knowledge is a process of dividing epistemic labor19. We have experts in 
different fields who obtain (or reconfirm) facts and pass them into the public domain. But it is 
not that simple. The experts we rely on are also relying on other experts! Scientists are permitted 
to assume such things such as 212˚F being the boiling point of water and so on; they do not have 
to go and empirically test this out every time to justify their experiments, so scientists base their 
findings on presumptions established by other scientists, and those scientists on other scientists, 
and eventually if we dig down enough through the levels of knowledge we will end up with an 
originating cause of a piece of publicly known information and there would be many levels of 
knowledge, like a pyramid.  
However, public knowledge does not have a unilateral direction of fit. It is very rare for 
an expert (or anyone else) to rely on sources without proffering some reciprocating information. 
I might go to a doctor because I am unwell, and the doctor has knowledge as to my symptoms 
and how to alleviate them. But although the doctor has more medical knowledge than I do, a 
doctor cannot assess my symptoms and suggest a remedy without relying on my at least 
describing how I am feeling. A doctor relies on testimony from his or her patient in order to 
know what ailment the patient is suffering from. I am relying on my doctor to tell me about my 
symptoms, but in order for him (or her) to do so, he or she must first know dip into the pool of 
public knowledge to ascertain what the symptoms indicate. But I am part of that pool of 
knowledge, because the doctor relies on what I know about how I feel!  
So perhaps the pyramid model for knowledge is not exactly correct. The simplistic pyramid 
structure has been widely criticized because it does not account for the mutual reinforcement 
between an explanation and what it explains20. My knowledge fits in with my other beliefs and 
knowledge, but those other beliefs have been selected because they also fit with my knowledge. 
A more suitable version is a lattice or web structure, in which we have an interlocking set of 
shared facts. It is very rare that one would have to rely on the knowledge of someone who has 
not (at some other point) relied on oneself. Knowledge is pervasive and the mutual expectations 
we have of each other exist at all levels, between experts and non-experts. 
 
Causation and the lattice structure 
How does the causal chain fit the lattice structure? I have indicated that causation has a 
unilateral direction of fit, so how do we obtain mutual support for a causal picture? I think the 
answer lies in our conventions21. Convention by definition has symmetry to it, based on mutual 
                                                 
19 This is analogous to the division of linguistic labor that Putnam refers to in his paper: “Meaning and Reference”, 
Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1970). 
20 Quine W. V., and Ullian, J., The Web of Belief (2nd Ed.), Random House, 1979, p 79. 
21 See Lewis, Convention, ibid. 
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expectation22. Take the previous example of my walking down the street. I suppose there is a 
cause for the signs that I see. This is one direction that the causation and expectation run in. 
Now, suppose I own a bookstore, and I want to sell books. A person wanting books goes to a 
bookstore. A person wanting to sell books wants people who want books to go to their bookstore. 
So we have established a mutual expectation of selling/being sold books. But where is the 
causation? One cause of books being sold is advertising. I might put up a sign that says “books 
for sale”. Assuming others can read and use the same language, whether or not I sell books (and 
how many) counterfactually depends on what sign I put up (if at all). So human action is more 
causal than logical, because there may not be any logical reason for selling the books, but there is 
a causal reason arising out of social convention. 
Similarly, in many cases, we are mutually the causes of each other’s knowledge. We are a 
community of knowers, and it is commonplace for us to learn from each other23. Quine suggests 
that the “totality of our knowledge or beliefs… is a man-made fabric which impinges on 
experience only along the edges”24. This suggests that the causal relation exists at the periphery 
between knowledge and experience. However, a “thread” is causally related to the other 
“threads” by virtue of being interwoven, and if a “thread” is changed at the periphery, the change 
also has an effect on the other threads.  
A well-known illustration is the Ship of Neurath25. All sides of the boat mutually support 
other sides and rely on a mutual configuration of the ship. The set of planks in the ship have a 
relationship between them and the whole set of planks (that is, the ship) is held up by the water. 
The water as a whole holds up the entire hull of the ship in virtue of the two-way forces between 
the planks in the hull. Likewise, human knowledge is supported by reality as a whole, not one 
“plank” at a time. Each item depends on others for support. The interrelated causal structure 
between the planks is also causally related to the world.  
However, within the lattice structure, there are sections which may be more unilateral 
than others. A kindergarten teacher may be able to impart a lot of knowledge to her students, but 
not receive much in return. Conversely, a university professor and a class of graduate students 
may have more balance in knowledge and therefore a more lattice-like information exchange. 
Nonetheless, the overall structure of our shared knowledge is lattice-like, and such “pyramidal” 
instances are uncommon. 
 
Conclusion 
The traditional view of the Cartesian skeptic is mistaken. We do not actually behave in 
the way that the skeptic supposes, as we have a large pool of shared knowledge. Our social 
background tells us what the relevant knowledge to draw from the pool is in any given case. We 
already have a common language between us so the content of our knowledge can be expressed, 
                                                 
22 Again, we could use Searle’s term “collective intentionality”. 
23 Kitcher, P., The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, Oxford University Press 1983, pp 4-5. 
24 Quine, W. V., From a Logical Point of View, Harper Torchbooks, 1961, pp 42-44. 
25 Quine, W.V., Word and Object, MIT Press, 1960 pp 3-4. 
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and it can be understood to be within a particular context. This is due to our social conventions 
governing language and social behavior.  
Our knowledge is shared through the causal history of the facts at hand. We pass 
knowledge to one another and occasionally reaffirm what we know in the public domain. Expert 
testimony is particularly relevant as it shows our readiness to rely on facts that we have not 
empirically proven ourselves. However, there is interdependence in the division of epistemic 
labor and as such the imparting of knowledge takes place on a lattice-like, and not a pyramidal, 
structure. In sharing facts we are also commonly mutual causes of each other’s knowledge. And 
so it is through this combination of mutual dependence and sharing that we arrive at a theory of 
knowledge which truly reflects the society in which we live. 
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